quickly through injunctions than if it had to undertake them itself and later sue for reimbursement.
Section I of this Comment sets forth the general structure of CERCLA and describes the balance of power between the federal government and the states under the current CERCLA scheme. Section II provides an introduction to the array of state "miniSuperfund" statutes and their uneasy coexistence with CERCLA. Section III analyzes some of the policy problems that arise from the current system, especially in light of federalism principles. Section IV presents a proposal to improve the process of hazardous waste cleanup.
I. THE CURRENT ROLE OF THE STATES UNDER CERCLA
A. The General Structure of CERCLA In 1979, the evacuation at Love Canal in New York drew national attention to the problem of hazardous waste sites and increased pressure on Congress to pass legislation concerning cleanup procedures. I2 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)' 3 already provided "cradle to grave" regulation of hazardous wastes, but RCRA's considerable federal enforcement power did not extend to waste dumps created before the enactment of the statute. 1 4 In the final days of the 1980 congressional term, Congress passed CERCLA. The statute imposed taxes on the chemical industry to fund the Hazardous Substance Superfund (the "Superfund"), which would finance EPA cleanups of hazardous waste sites.' 5 CERCLA also established, in general terms, the procedures and standards to be followed in carrying out the cleanups.
The original version of CERCLA was the product of a hastily worked-out compromise. It was passed with almost no debate and under a suspension of the rules.' 6 As a result of this unorthodox process, the drafters of CERCLA gave insufficient thought to such basic features of the statute as the liability rules and the mechanics of implementation. 1 Therefore, Congress tried to correct these problems when it reauthorized money for the Superfund under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).' 8 Substantive changes in CERCLA included setting deadlines for the EPA on cleanups, specifying settlement policy, and ensuring defendants' right to contribution. Congress also increased the 1986-1991 Superfund authorization to $8.5 billion.
As amended, CERCLA contains several major provisions governing the orderly cleanup of hazardous waste sites. It requires the President to revise the National Contingency Plan to "establish procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances."' 19 CERCLA also authorizes the EPA to investigate sites, and requires the agency to compile a National Priorities List 2° of sites that present the greatest danger. 2 ' The EPA can use the Superfund to finance "remedial actions," 2 2 defined as "those actions consistent with permanent remedy [sic] taken instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment. ' ' 23 Remedial actions include site-specific actions such as "storage, confinement,... neutralization, cleanup..., recycling or reuse, repair or replacement of containers, ... incineration"; they also include relocation of residents and offsite transport and storage. 24 The EPA may then sue polluters for reimbursement of the Grad, 8 Colum J Envir L at 1 (cited in note 12). 17 See In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 675 F Supp 22, 25-26 n 2 (D Mass 1987) .
2 ' Pub L No 99-499, 100 Stat 1613 (1986 , codified as an amendment to CERCLA, 42 USC § § 9601-9675.
19 42 USC § 9605(a). The President, in turn, has delegated this task, along with most of his authority under CERCLA, to the EPA. See id. The National Contingency Plan already existed as part of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (now called the Clean Water Act), 33 USC § § 1251 -1387 (1982 & Supp 1989 . The Plan's official name is the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, and is described at 40 CFR § 300 (1989) . Before CERCLA, the National Contingency Plan served as a blueprint for dealing with environmental disasters such as oil spills. See Joseph Freedman, Proposed Amendments to the National Contingency Plan: Explanation and Analysis, 19 Envir L Repr 10105, 10105-07 (1989) . 20 The National Priorities List is found at 40 CFR § 300, Appendix B (1989).
22 42 USC § 9605.
22 Remedial actions are confined to sites that appear on the National Priorities List. 40 CFR § 300.68(a)(1) (1986) .
23 42 USC § 9601(24) (emphasis added).
costs of the remedial action." Liability under CERCLA is strict, joint, and several. 6 Other key provisions of CERCLA deal with emergency situations. When the EPA concludes that a hazardous waste site requires a quick response, it can undertake a "removal, 27 which is defined simply as "the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment. '28 In addition, when the President believes that a certain site presents an "imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment," he can require the Attorney General to file an action for federal injunctive relief to abate the danger. 29 1. When the federal government responds first.
In the typical remedial action contemplated by CERCLA, the EPA identifies, investigates, analyzes, and cleans up the hazardous waste site. The states have a significant, if secondary, role in this process: states must submit suggestions for sites to be included on the National Priorities List, 34 and must be permitted "substantial and meaningful involvement" in the "initiation, development, and selection of remedial actions" within the state. 3 5 In addition, the EPA cannot spend Superfund money without securing an agreement from the affected state to pay at least ten percent of the cost of the remedial action; 36 the affected state must also agree to maintain the site in the future and to provide a federally-approved disposal facility for the wastes removed. 7 CERCLA's displacement of the states in the cleanup process creates potential sources of friction between the federal and state governments. For example, if the EPA decides to undertake a remedial action, the state may apply to the EPA to participate in or to perform the action itself, but the decision lies wholly with the EPA. 3 8 Although the EPA may want states to assume a larger role in the cleanups, it seems to doubt that they will do an acceptable job. 9 Another potential source of friction is the EPA's power to propose remedies during settlement talks even when the remedies do not meet state standards; federal courts are not bound to honor a state's request that its standards be followed. 40 Once the EPA decides tb clean up a site, these structural and institutional biases often result in the states being sidelined during the cleanup process. [57:985 "persons," which includes states, 41 to recover response costs from cleanups that are consistent with the National Contingency Plan. 42 Second, each state is made the trustee of the natural resources in that state (unless they are controlled by the federal government) and is entitled to sue polluters who destroy those natural resources. 43 States may act under federal law pursuant only to these provisions. CERCLA does not, however, prevent states from using their own laws to cleanup sites on the National Priorities List. 44 The right to sue polluters directly for injunctive relief under CERCLA, as the federal government can under § 9606, would give the states a powerful enforcement tool. The economizing feature of injunctions would mitigate the cost of cleaning the large number of sites that need attention within a reasonable time frame. 45 Since the only costs the government must bear up front when bringing a suit for an injunction are the costs of maintaining the action, a state could initiate more cleanups at one time. Therefore, expanding the power of the states to obtain injunctions in federal court should result in more sites being cleaned up more quickly.
The question whether states in fact possess such a right has been hotly debated. As part of SARA, Congress added the following provision to CERCLA: "A State may enforce any Federal or State standard, requirement, criteria, or limitation to which the remedial action is required to conform under this Act in the United States district court for the district in which the facility is located. ' ' 4 8 Although this provision appears at first blush to authorize states to initiate actions for injunctive relief, an examination of 41 42 USC § 9601(21). 4' The EPA has set out guidelines for state compliance with the National Contingency Plan in cleanups not involving the federal government. For example, when undertaking a remedial action, the state must satisfy the Plan's provisions relating to remedial investigations, cost-effective responses, and opportunity for public comment. Three reasons suggest that the Idarado court incorrectly interpreted § 9621(e)(2). First, the court resorted to a plain meaning argument, simply quoting the sentence about safe enforcement and stating, "Thus injunctive relief is also available to the state under CERCLA. ' '49 But this argument ignores the larger statutory context of § 9621(e)(2). The state enforcement provision applies only to "remedial action[s] selected under section [9604] or secured under section [9606] . ' ' 50 Those sections of CERCLA authorize only the federal government to initiate Superfund projects, not the states. 51 Second, the immediate context of the provision strongly suggests that the grant of enforcement power to the states is confined to existing consent decrees. The phrase immediately following the grant of enforcement power in § 9621(e)(2)-"Any consent decree shall require"-suggests that the previous sentence refers only to situations in which a consent decree exists. It is unlikely that Congress intended an isolated sentence to create a broad new stateinitiated remedial action, especially since the President himself may sue for injunctions only when the hazardous waste poses an "imminent and substantial endangerment to public health." 2 Third, the legislative history of the provision argues convincingly against broad remedial powers for the states. The House Report explains the purpose of § 9621(e)(2) as follows: "States are given the authority to enforce requirements of consent decrees to which the remedial action must conform." 53 Although the actual language of § 9621(e)(2) is not clear on its face, the best reading of the statute appears to limit state enforcement power to existing consent decrees.
II. STATE RESPONSES UNDER STATE LAW
As noted earlier, the drafters of CERCLA hoped to fill the void created by the states' inability or unwillingness to address hazardous waste cleanup. 5 4 At the same time they sought to centralize federal control over cleanup actions, however, the drafters wanted the states to assume a large portion of the burdens CER-CLA would impose, both in terms of money and resources. A potential conflict thus arose: as states passed legislation and developed infrastructures to meet their financial responsibilities under CERCLA, they inevitably sought greater control over hazardous waste cleanup.
CERCLA originally required states to contribute money to each remedial action, 5 but simultaneously withheld control from the states by forbidding them from using state tax dollars to pay "compensation for claims for any costs of response or damage or claims which may be compensated under this title. § 44-56-20, 44-56-160, 44-56-170, 44-56-180, 44-56-190, and 44-56-200 The history of CERCLA has been marked by a slowly increasing willingness on the part of the federal government to expand state involvement in the CERCLA program, 6 but always keeping the states in a secondary role. While the newly revised National Contingency Plan (which took effect April 9, 1990) is meant to establish a "partnership" between the federal and state governments, the federal government has kept ultimate control of the program for itself. For example, the EPA declined to delegate to the states the power to select remedies for hazardous waste sites."' In addition, the EPA decided not to promulgate a rule that would have allowed deferral of the listing of sites on the National Priorities List based on the capability of states to respond. 17 This leaves open the theoretical possibility that the EPA could interrupt a state's cleanup activities and force it to abide by the provisions of CERCLA.
Thus, the current balance of power under CERCLA heavily favors the federal government over the states. The Supreme Court recently confirmed this imbalance, stating that Congress legitimately used the commerce power to displace the states under CERCLA. 6 5 States can mount their own cleanup efforts under state laws, but once the EPA becomes involved, the states play only a secondary role. States suggest sites to be cleaned, assist in the cleanup if the EPA allows them, and intervene in reimbursement actions if the EPA ignores state standards in negotiating a consent decree. 6e In sum, CERCLA severely circumscribes the role of the states in hazardous waste cleanup. 
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT SCHEME I
A. The Theory of Federalism CERCLA makes the federal government responsible for cleaning up almost all of the serious hazardous waste sites in the country. As we have seen, thefederal government may enlist a state's help in a number of secondary roles, but retains a large amount of discretion regarding the extent of state involvement. Complaints have arisen about the system's effectiveness in achieving its goals. 70 The theory and rationale for our system of federalism illuminate some of the problems and suggest the need for more state control under CERCLA.
Arguments made during the ratification period of the Constitution reveal the Framers' and ratifiers' understanding of the federal system as limited by concerns of state autonomy. For example, James Madison wrote in Federalist 45: "The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement and prosperity of the State."' '1 Similarly, James Wilson told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that "[wihatever object of government is confined in its operation and effect, within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of that state.
17 2 Thus, matters whose effects did not extend beyond the boundaries of a state, as hazardous waste cleanups often do not, were considered primarily state matters.
The federal government's creation and centralization of a national program for cleaning up hazardous waste sites reflects a twentieth-century trend toward increasing federal regulatory control. 7 422-25, 504-08 (1987) .
7 Id at 505.
[57:985 the increasing economic interdependency of states. In addition, states appeared to be "arenas for factional strife and parochialism," 7 5 unable to solve a number of pressing problems.
The original justifications for CERCLA reflect this New Deal legacy. Throughout the 1970s, states were widely perceived as ineffectual in drafting and implementing meaningful environmental regulation. Moreover, states were seen as reluctant, even uncooperative, partners with the federal government in implementing federal environmental programs. 1 8 When the pressing need for hazardous waste cleanup became apparent, Congress assumed that the national government should take a leading, even dominant, role.
7
After all, at the time of CERCLA's enactment, only a handful of states had legislation that could even begin to address the problem.
This pessimism about the states' ability to perform adequate cleanups seems to persist within the federal government. 7 8 Yet, during the past decade, many states have gained expertise and achieved successes of their own.7 e These achievements are even more notable given the powerful incentives under the current scheme for states to conserve their resources and remain in the background, letting the federal government shoulder the full burdens of hazardous waste cleanup.
B. Federalism Applied to CERCLA 1. Interstate coordination.
Many systems of environmental regulation are usefully and efficiently carried out at the federal level due to economies of scale and scope. As one commentator has noted, "[c]ollection of data and analysis of environmental problems, standard setting and (in some instances) selection of control measures involve recurring, 
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technically complex issues; such steps can often be taken far more cheaply [] on the national level." ' 0 National coordination, however, is unnecessary in the context of CERCLA. The Superfund was created to facilitate the cleanup of a large number of hazardous waste sites scattered throughout the country. As noted earlier, these sites are not interconnected: they are discrete and usually within the confines of a single state. 8 , Moreover, as of October 17, 1989, the EPA cannot begin a remedial action until the affected state guarantees that it will provide a federally-approved disposal facility for the removed substances;" 2 thus, even waste disposal occurs within the affected state. Indeed, the entire remedial action is a function that might normally be thought of as within the police power of a state-the protection of local public health.
Similarly, the National Priorities List does not perform a necessary or even very useful coordinating function at the federal level. Some sites are on the National Priorities List simply because each state is guaranteed at least one site on the List."' The rest of the sites are chosen by means of the Hazard Ranking System, 4 whose underlying scores are based on subjective judgments by evaluators, often state officials. Some evaluators use "realistic" assumptions, while others use "worst case scenarios." 8 5 The Hazard Ranking System has been changed several times, and it can be manipulated to control the number of sites placed on the List." Finally, the National Priorities List is somewhat arbitrary, having evolved from an ad hoc, working draft of potential cleanup sites to its current significance as an exclusive list of sites that will receive remedial action. 8 7 Although the current system is not well-suited to carry out its purportedly federal objectives, the Hazard Ranking System and National Priorities List could be redesigned to achieve their intended goals. 8 8 The EPA's monopoly on hazardous waste cleanup creates other, more serious problems, however. Having only one lo- cus of decisionmaking means that the progress of hazardous waste cleanup is totally dependent on how quickly that one agency can address the problem. In the early 1980s, when inaction in the EPA hindered enforcement of CERCLA,s 9 hazardous waste cleanup was jeopardized across the entire country. Although Congress tried to rectify that situation with SARA, the EPA still has begun less than three hundred of an expected two thousand or more cleanups on the National Priorities List. e° The current structure of CERCLA effectively bottles up state resources while the EPA plods through the National Priorities List. CERCLA puts all the national environmental cleanup "eggs" in one basket, thus increasing the risk that no significant cleanups will occur. Absent a need for national coordination, the authority to perform cleanups should be dispersed among the states.
Political accountability and sensitivity to local concerns.
The EPA's monopoly on hazardous waste cleanup does not adequately respect the diversity of interests held by the affected states. As Professor Michael McConnell states, "So long as preferences for government policies are unevenly distributed among the various localities, more people can be satisfied by decentralized decisionmaking than by a single national authority." 91 The diversity of approaches taken by the states to the problem of hazardous waste cleanup in their own statutes reflects different policy tradeoffs with respect to those cleanups. Congress's displacement of state authority under CERCLA is especially puzzling when one considers that local decisionmaking authority has been honored in so many other federal environmental schemes, such as the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA 2 sites across the nation would improve the National Priorities List as a centralized source of information about those sites needing the greatest attention. From the beginning, CERCLA has required financial assistance from the states." As discussed earlier, many states responded to this requirement by creating their own "miniSuperfund" laws. Once enacted, states often used these statutes for both CERCLA and non-CERCLA cleanups. Having been drawn into the hazardous waste cleanup business by the federal government, these states have become increasingly interested in administering and implementing cleanup programs. 4 This emerging state interest has led to wasteful competititon for control of cleanup efforts at individual sites. The Akzo case discussed earlier exemplifies this phenomenon. 5 Akzo involved a consent decree proposed by the EPA, which suggested one cleanup method-w"soil flushing"-instead of the state's preferred remedy-incineration.
9 6 Soil flushing is a cheaper remedy, but Michigan contended that the method would have uncertain consequences and that its use might violate state laws. 9 7 Thus, the state sought to intervene in the federal action to challenge the proposed consent decree and to require the EPA and the defendants to comply with state law. 98 This is a striking example of a state and the EPA fighting each other in the courts, with the state trying to force the EPA to impose a stricter, costlier standard on the responsible parties. CERCLA gives states the right to intervene when the remedial action does not conform to state standards, 9 but the statute does not require that state standards be satisfied. These rules provide no incentive for the EPA to take state concerns into account when negotiating settlements under CERCLA; in practice, the EPA often ignores state interests. For example, the EPA is currently engaged in consent decree negotiations concerning a site owned by Champion International near Libby, Montana. Despite the state of Montana's requests to participate, the EPA is conducting unilateral negotiations with Champion, limiting Montana to a "consultative role" that effectively "preclude[s it] from any subsequent decisionmaking role concerning activity conducted or results achieved 
IV. A LARGER ROLE FOR THE STATES UNDER CERCLA
As the foregoing discussion indicates, CERCLA is not working as well as its drafters had hoped or intended. In thinking about how CERCLA might be improved, it is important to recognize that many aspects of the statute are worthwhile and effective. Like many other environmental problems, hazardous waste cleanup benefits from cooperation between states and the federal government; state governments vigorously protect local interests and tailor solutions to local concerns, while the federal government sets national standards, provides funding and expertise, and tackles multistate problems. Each government capitalizes on its strengths. Consistent with these institutional capabilities, this Section proposes two ways to increase the states' role in initiation and implementation of hazardous waste cleanups.
A. Return the Initiative to the States
Many of the other federal environmental statutes combine uniform, federal standards with state implementation. 1 6 But CER-CLA is just the opposite: the federal government bears the major burden of implementation within a framework of federal and potentially applicable state laws. Most of the Superfund sites, however, are geographically within the borders of individual states and do not generate externalities affecting other states. Therefore, the problems of interstate effects and coordination-the traditional province of the federal government-are generally not present in hazardous waste cleanup. This suggests that the current degree of centralization is unjustified and that the burden of implementation could be more profitably borne by the states.
CERCLA should be amended so that its enforcement and implementation structure more closely resemble that of the Clean Air Act. Under the proposed revision of CERCLA, federal law would mandate a certain number of state-initiated cleanups of National Priorities List sites to be completed within a certain length of time. 107 CERCLA would continue to impose liability on responsible 104 See, for example, the Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7410 (State Implementation Plans), § 7408 (National Ambient Air Quality Standards); RCRA, 42 USC § § 6926, 6929, 2931, 6946-48, 6961, 6972, 6992f; and Clean Water Act, 33 USC § § 1342 , 1370 (1982 & 1989 .
107 The EPA would continue to maintain the National Priorities List as an informational aid to the states and for its own use in oversight activities. On the other hand, Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies (RI/FS), which are the studies the EPA does to determine the extent of the danger at a site and propose a remedy for that site, are probably better handled at the state level because they are site-specific and because the state, not the parties for the past dumping of certain specified substances, as it does now, but only the states would have statutory authority to bring enforcement actions. Which sites to clean and which actions to bring are decisions that should be left to the discretion of the states. 10 8 If a cleanup were beyond the expertise of a state, the EPA would be allowed to assist the state in the cleanup, but only at the state's request.
The revised CERCLA should also allow the EPA to maintain an oversight role by requiring EPA approval of state remedial plans. 10 9 The EPA would assess the remedial plans against the National Contingency Plan, which would remain in effect and preempt state law to the extent that state standards were less stringent. 11 0 But CERCLA should ensure that the National Contingency Plan is focused on the cleanliness of sites, not on preference of certain technological methods of cleanup. If the state demonstrates to the EPA that a remedial action chosen by the state will achieve the level of cleanliness required by the National Contingency Plan by whatever means, then the EPA Administrator must approve it."' Under the proposal, preemption of state standards that do not meet certain minimal criteria furthers several policies. First, a uniform floor throughout the country would eliminate the so-called "race to the bottom," the incentive for states to relax their cleanup standards in an effort to encourage business development. Yet above the minimum specified by federal law, states would be free to make their own tradeoffs. Thus, the proposal preserves a substantial amount of state autonomy while ensuring that a minimum level of hazardous waste cleanup will be achieved. Second, uniform minimum standards reduce in part the transaction costs that would result from a completely decentralized system; ex ante federal government, will normally act on the RIMPS by cleaning up the site. 
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agreement on the standards will defuse some of the antagonism between the states, the responsible parties, and the federal government. 112 Third, preemption ensures that states pursue permanent remedies, as required by the National Contingency Plan and CERCLA. 113 In effect, CERCLA currently establishes a presumption that the EPA will carry out the cleanup; generally, states may assume the federal role only with the EPA's permission. The revised CER-CLA reverses that presumption: states have primary responsibility for cleanup, and the EPA may intervene only with the permission of the affected state. The EPA retains the ability to become involved at the state's request in remedial actions because some projects are too big or too complicated for individual states to handle alone. States may choose to enlist the aid of the federal government, which may have more expertise or resources. This potential for federal action and the need for maintaining minimum federal standards suggest that states should notify the EPA before undertaking cleanup actions. Even if states enlist the federal government to clean most sites, the revised CERCLA is preferable to EPA centralization because of the political accountability and comity concerns discussed earlier.
Because states assume primary responsibility for cleanups under the revised CERCLA, a state may take action either under its own laws or under CERCLA. In either case, however, the primary source of funding should be from the states. Simply having a large federal fund to finance state-led efforts would create other problems associated with federalism. When the federal government provides a common pool of funding for the states to use in predominantly local projects, each state will be relieved from considering its own budgetary constraints and will demand more from the federal fund than it would otherwise spend itself.
11 4 The Superfund should remain dedicated primarily to federal actions (i.e., remedial actions performed by the EPA at the request of a state).
This revised CERCLA returns a large measure of self-determination to the states in the cleanup of hazardous wastes. State governments are likely to be more responsive, and the EPA is too far removed from the affected people in many instances to effectively 112 Recall the wasteful battles now taking place in the federal courts between state governments, the EPA, and the Justice Department. See Section HI. [57:985 meet the needs of a particular situation. 1 1 " 5 Therefore, the proposed revision responds to the major federalism objection under the current CERCLA scheme: intrastate matters could be resolved by local officials elected by the affected groups.
It may well be that in 1980, when CERCLA was passed, the states were not prepared to assume the responsibility of cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste sites, but the increasing interest and involvement of states suggests that they now are. While the federal government may have a certain comparative expertise, it lacks sensitivity to local needs. The states, therefore, should assume primary responsibility for the implementation of hazardous waste cleanups.
B. Allow States to Sue for Injunctions in Federal Court
In addition to initiating hazardous waste cleanup, states should have the right to sue polluters for federal injunctions under CERCLA. As discussed in Section I, CERCLA currently allows states to enforce only the provisions of existing consent decrees in federal court.
Under this second proposed revision of CERCLA, states would have the same power as the President to "secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat" 1 1 6 in the federal courts. This power to seek an injunction gives the states an additional weapon against sudden spills or emergencies. 117 Injunctions are cheaper than government-sponsored cleanups in two ways." 8 First, the government cannot always expect to recover all of its costs in an action for reimbursement because CERCLA provides defenses (albeit limited), and because it sometimes proves impossible to establish which parties are responsible." 9 Second, the government does not have the same profit motive as private firms; private firms are probably in a better position to find the cheapest ways of performing the cleanups.
Since the passage of CERCLA, the federal courts have construed the statute broadly in favor of allowing injunctive actions for abatement to go forward. For example, one court, analyzing the 215 See Sunstein, 101 Harv L Rev at 505 (cited in note 73) ("[I] t is no longer credible to believe that federal agencies can serve as an outlet for democratic aspirations.").
118 42 USC § 9606(a).
" See text at note 45. requirement of "imminent and substantial endangerment," held that "endangerment" means only potential harm, and that "imminent" can include situations in which the harm will not occur for several years. 120 Another court held that the endangerment requirement is met by a showing that there "may be risk of harm," and that the "substantial endangerment" need not be quantified. 121 Moreover, the government need not satisfy the traditional equitable requirement showing irreparable harm in suits for injunctions. 22 If the federal courts continue to interpret CERCLA broadly for purposes of granting injunctions, states will have a very powerful tool at their disposal.
CONCLUSION
Congress's decision to vest most of the decisionmaking and implementation authority of the Superfund program in the federal government makes CERCLA an oddity among federal environmental statutes. 23 Most major environmental legislation, including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA (the other half of Congress's approach to the hazardous waste problem) involve the states to a much greater extent than does CERCLA. Yet the rationales underlying those laws apply at least as well to CERCLA.
Two fundamental shifts in the structure and philosophy of CERCLA should be enacted. First, control over the implementation of remedial actions under CERCLA should be given to the states. The EPA could maintain an oversight and advisory role and could intervene in a remedial action with the state's permission. Shifting the major decisionmaking authority from the EPA to the states enhances political accountability and better comports with principles of federalism. Second, the states should be allowed to enjoin polluters in federal court under CERCLA. This power complements increased state responsibility for implementation of the program, and it should produce less costly solutions in many cleanups.
As David Stockman said, the federal government "cannot do everything"; 2 4 nor was it intended to do everything. In the context of environmental regulation, self-determination and local control over local matters are important principles. It is troublesome that
